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Spring 1943 Plans

Jack Kruse1 Comment

The Soviet Command in mid-February 1943 was filled with optimism. Marshal Golikov believed the Germans were in full retreat. General Vatutin felt the same and discounted General Popov’s and Lieutenant General Kuznetsov’s objections due to the exhaustion of the troops, supply difficulties, worn out equipment, and low unit strength. Vatutin felt the Germans were on the run and believed Southwest Front could destroy the German forces in the Donbass.

Stavka ordered Voronezh, Southwest, and South Fronts pursue German forces out of the Ukraine east of the Dniepr River. This order neglected the fact that the nearest source of supplies for these fronts was Kharkov, 105 kilometers to the rear.

Marshal Zhukov objected to the main assault on the southern part of the front, feeling the best option was to use forces to the north which had not been involved with the fighting in Stalingrad. Stalin overrode Zhukov. He wanted to take Kharkov, intending to use it as a springboard for the taking of Kiev.

As the Germans retreated, von Manstein used the time consolidating his armor in the Poltava area, preparing for a counter offensive. Hitler inclined toward a ‘Stand Fast’ order with an objective of retaking Kharkov. Von Manstein recommended waiting until the Soviet Army took the crossings on the Upper Dniepr, then striking with his Panzers north and south of the Soviet spearhead before the spring thaw. This maneuver would cause Kharkov to fall and give the Germans six weeks respite during the thaw to consolidate their forces and restore cohesion.

In the first phase of von Manstein’s plan the SS Panzer Corps would assemble at Krasnograd, while the 48 and 57 Panzer Corps would gather at Krasnoarmeyskoye. These forces would converge on the right wing of the Soviet Southwest Front.

In phase two these forces would regroup southwest of Kharkov and strike the Voronezh front, driving them back over the northern Donets to recapture Kharkov and Belgorod.

In the third phase II Panzer Army from Army Group Center would strike south from Orel to meet von Manstein’s strike from the south to take Kursk.

The offensive start date was February 19 – 20. The day before the offensive von Manstein would take command of forces as Krasnogrod and Krasnoarmeyskoye. The forces consisted of VII Panzer Division, SS Viking Motorized Infantry Division, and four army infantry divisions.

On 18 February Vatutin launched his attack in accordance with the Stavka directive. This included 6th Army reinforced by one corps of tanks and one of cavalry to cut off the German retreat to the Dniepr River. The rest of his forces, along with the South Front would attack to keep the Germans pinned in the Donbass.

Regrettably, ‘Front Mobile Force’ was worn down my months of combat. Their strength included 13,000 men, and 53 tanks. The Germans had a superiority of 2 to 1 in manpower, 7 to 1 in tanks, and 3 to 1 in aircraft.

Air reconnaissance on 19 February revealed a heavy concentration of German armor around Krasnograd and southwest of Krasnoarmeyskoe and large numbers of German troops at Dnepropetrovsk.

Source: ‘Soviet Setback After Stalingrad’, Geoffrey Jukes, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

The German Retreat from Stalingrad

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Even as the operation to eliminate von Paulus’ foothold in Stalingrad proceeded, Stavka planned operations to destroy German forces in the Caucasus. This plan included cutting through left flank of Army Group A, commanded by General Kleist, at Elista. A second operation would attack north toward Aravir from the Terek River through the Caucasus passes. A third attack envisioned movements by Vatutin’s and Yeremenko’s forces down the Don River to Rostov. Stavka’s goal was to clear the Caucasus for good.

General Kleist’s analysis of his situation found the Soviet forces 65 kilometers from Rostov while his own units were nearly 630 kilometers from Rostov. Initially, Hitler prohibited a retreat only to authorize a tactical retreat the next day stipulating that Kleist bring all his equipment and supplies with him. General Kleist possessed 18 divisions, including 11 Panzer divisions, one Panzer Grenadier Division and seven infantry divisions. They covered a 160-kilometer front between Zmyev and Slavyansk.

Stavka’s plan ordered Voronezh Front, commanded by General F.I. Golikov, with four infantry armies, a tank army, and an air army, to capture the Liski-Kantemirovka railway. They ordered Southwest Front, commanded by General N.F. Vatutin., with three infantry armies, an air army, and a Front Mobile Group, to establish itself at Starobelsk and attack toward the Black Sea coast at Mariupol. These two fronts possessed 54 divisions and ten tank corps. Both fronts had fought through the entire Stalingrad campaign and bordered on exhaustion. Additionally, the goals of these fronts required advancing on diverging axes with no troops to fill the gap.

To the north, Army Group B fielded 19 divisions. Army Group Don possessed 18 divisions. Field Marshal von Manstein now commanded these forces. Von Manstein demanded permission to withdraw from Rostov to the Mius River line. He received a summons from Hitler to discuss this demand on 6 February, 1943. He went to meet Hitler with some trepidation, but, to von Manstein’s surprise, Hitler authorized a tactical withdrawal and advised von Manstein he would transfer divisions from France to the Ukraine.

As it happened, the Soviets took Voronezh on 26 January, and Kursk on 8 February, 1943.

In the Caucasus the race for Rostov proceeded. The Soviets outran their supply facilities and administrative skills. They possessed less than half the transport needed to bring up food, fuel, and ammunition to cut off the German forces at Rostov. When they took Rostov on 14 February, Kleist and his Army group A had already passed through. Kleist was promoted to field marshal as a result.

On 16 February the Soviets took Kharkov and Voroshilovgrad. In Kharkov the Soviets found the city population of 900,000 had been reduced to 300,000 inhabitants. The Germans had deported 12,000 to German labor camps and 70,000 to 80,000 had died of hunger and cold. Thirty thousand, including sixteen thousand Jews, had been slaughtered.

Soviet forces captured Pavlograd, 32 kilometers from the Dnieper River on 17 February. Kuznetson’s tanks arrived in the vicinity of von Manstein’s headquarters at Zaporozhye.

Sources: Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Soviet Setback after Stalingrad”, Geoffrey Jukes, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

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Reducing the Stalingrad Pocket

The Soviet Air Force remained busy during December 1942 supporting 3rd Guards Army and 5th Tank Army’s attacks against German concentrations near Kotelnikovo. 2nd and 17th Air Armies provided 455 aircraft opposing the Luftwaffe’s 450. When 3rd Composite Air Corps joined the 17th Air Army the balance of power shifted to the Soviet side.

Deteriorating weather interrupted air support for the engaged forces until 15 December when the weather again improved. The Soviet Southwest Front went on the offensive on 16 December with the Air Force attacking German defensive lines and troop concentrations at Toerdockhlevovka, Radchenskoye, Boguchev, and airfields at Tatsinskaya and Morozovsk.

On 18 December the 16th Air Army struck enemy forces near Karpovka with 100 aircraft. This attack allowed Soviet forces to break through the German defense lines. By the end of 21 December Soviet air action closed all escape routes for the Italian 8th Army.

The 24th Tank Corps commanded by Major General V.M. Badanov, took the airfields and rail line at Tatsinskaya destroying 350 German aircraft, five equipment dumps, and seven warehouses.

By this time the 2nd Guards Army, reinforced by 6th and 7th Tank Corps, had a two to one superiority in men and tanks, and a 1.6 to 1 superiority in artillery. The Germans still had air superiority 1.7 to 1.

The Soviet 2nd Guards Army forced the German withdrawal from the Aksay River. On 25 December General Rotmistrov’s 7th Tank Corps crossed the river seizing Generalovsky.

On Christmas Day General von Paulus authorized the slaughter of 400 horses for food.

By 28 December the Soviets cut off all escape routes going west and southwest from Kotelnikovo. They also captured another airfield where they acquired fifteen aircraft, 800 cans of petrol, and large numbers of heavy bombs. The next day they captured Kotelnikovo itself.

General S. I. Bogdonov’s forces moved toward Rotmistrov’s corps forcing a general German withdrawal to Rostov.

General Malinovsky took Tormosin on 31 December capturing German supplies for Army Group Don.

As the German relief force fell back the distance between them and the surrounded Stalingrad forces increased to 200 to 250 kilometers. Seven Soviet armies now surrounded the Stalingrad pocket. Within the pocket ammunition, fuel, and food was running out. Eighty thousand German soldiers were lost to sickness and wounds leaving 250,000 remaining. Soviet aircraft shot down any remaining supply transports.

On 1 January, 1943, Adolf Hitler promised von Paulus that everything was being done to get them out. Meanwhile, Von Paulus set up a dense defense network.

The Soviet Don Front received reinforcements. The Stalingrad Front, operating on the inner front included the 57th, 62nd, and 64th Armies. The plan for liquidating the Stalingrad pocket, Operation ‘Ring’, was authorized on 4 January.

65th Army had a superiority over the surrounded German forces in the Stalingrad pocket of three to two in guns and mortars, and three to one in aircraft. The Germans superiority in men and tanks was six to five.

On 8 January the Soviets issued an ultimatum giving the Germans until 1000 hours 9 January to surrender. This ultimatum was rejected.

Leaflets rained down on Stalingrad on 9 January offering troops safety if they surrendered. Resisters would be wiped out. Von Paulus forbade any discussion of surrender.

On 10 January, at 0805 hours, artillery and air bombardment began.

Sources: The Soviet Air Force in World War II, translated by Leland Fetzer, Edited by Ray Wagner, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1973

Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Stalingrad: The Relief,” Colonel Alexander M. Samsonov, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s