The Soviet Command in mid-February 1943 was filled with optimism. Marshal Golikov believed the Germans were in full retreat. General Vatutin felt the same and discounted General Popov’s and Lieutenant General Kuznetsov’s objections due to the exhaustion of the troops, supply difficulties, worn out equipment, and low unit strength. Vatutin felt the Germans were on the run and believed Southwest Front could destroy the German forces in the Donbass.

Stavka ordered Voronezh, Southwest, and South Fronts pursue German forces out of the Ukraine east of the Dniepr River. This order neglected the fact that the nearest source of supplies for these fronts was Kharkov, 105 kilometers to the rear.

Marshal Zhukov objected to the main assault on the southern part of the front, feeling the best option was to use forces to the north which had not been involved with the fighting in Stalingrad. Stalin overrode Zhukov. He wanted to take Kharkov, intending to use it as a springboard for the taking of Kiev.

As the Germans retreated, von Manstein used the time consolidating his armor in the Poltava area, preparing for a counter offensive. Hitler inclined toward a ‘Stand Fast’ order with an objective of retaking Kharkov. Von Manstein recommended waiting until the Soviet Army took the crossings on the Upper Dniepr, then striking with his Panzers north and south of the Soviet spearhead before the spring thaw. This maneuver would cause Kharkov to fall and give the Germans six weeks respite during the thaw to consolidate their forces and restore cohesion.

In the first phase of von Manstein’s plan the SS Panzer Corps would assemble at Krasnograd, while the 48 and 57 Panzer Corps would gather at Krasnoarmeyskoye. These forces would converge on the right wing of the Soviet Southwest Front.

In phase two these forces would regroup southwest of Kharkov and strike the Voronezh front, driving them back over the northern Donets to recapture Kharkov and Belgorod.

In the third phase II Panzer Army from Army Group Center would strike south from Orel to meet von Manstein’s strike from the south to take Kursk.

The offensive start date was February 19 – 20. The day before the offensive von Manstein would take command of forces as Krasnogrod and Krasnoarmeyskoye. The forces consisted of VII Panzer Division, SS Viking Motorized Infantry Division, and four army infantry divisions.

On 18 February Vatutin launched his attack in accordance with the Stavka directive. This included 6^th Army reinforced by one corps of tanks and one of cavalry to cut off the German retreat to the Dniepr River. The rest of his forces, along with the South Front would attack to keep the Germans pinned in the Donbass.

Regrettably, ‘Front Mobile Force’ was worn down my months of combat. Their strength included 13,000 men, and 53 tanks. The Germans had a superiority of 2 to 1 in manpower, 7 to 1 in tanks, and 3 to 1 in aircraft.

Air reconnaissance on 19 February revealed a heavy concentration of German armor around Krasnograd and southwest of Krasnoarmeyskoe and large numbers of German troops at Dnepropetrovsk.

Source: ‘Soviet Setback After Stalingrad’, Geoffrey Jukes, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s