Jack Kruse, Author

Even as the operation to eliminate von Paulus’ foothold in Stalingrad proceeded, Stavka planned operations to destroy German forces in the Caucasus. This plan included cutting through left flank of Army Group A, commanded by General Kleist, at Elista. A second operation would attack north toward Aravir from the Terek River through the Caucasus passes. A third attack envisioned movements by Vatutin’s and Yeremenko’s forces down the Don River to Rostov. Stavka’s goal was to clear the Caucasus for good.

General Kleist’s analysis of his situation found the Soviet forces 65 kilometers from Rostov while his own units were nearly 630 kilometers from Rostov. Initially, Hitler prohibited a retreat only to authorize a tactical retreat the next day stipulating that Kleist bring all his equipment and supplies with him. General Kleist possessed 18 divisions, including 11 Panzer divisions, one Panzer Grenadier Division and seven infantry divisions. They covered a 160-kilometer front between Zmyev and Slavyansk.

Stavka’s plan ordered Voronezh Front, commanded by General F.I. Golikov, with four infantry armies, a tank army, and an air army, to capture the Liski-Kantemirovka railway. They ordered Southwest Front, commanded by General N.F. Vatutin., with three infantry armies, an air army, and a Front Mobile Group, to establish itself at Starobelsk and attack toward the Black Sea coast at Mariupol. These two fronts possessed 54 divisions and ten tank corps. Both fronts had fought through the entire Stalingrad campaign and bordered on exhaustion. Additionally, the goals of these fronts required advancing on diverging axes with no troops to fill the gap.

To the north, Army Group B fielded 19 divisions. Army Group Don possessed 18 divisions. Field Marshal von Manstein now commanded these forces. Von Manstein demanded permission to withdraw from Rostov to the Mius River line. He received a summons from Hitler to discuss this demand on 6 February, 1943. He went to meet Hitler with some trepidation, but, to von Manstein’s surprise, Hitler authorized a tactical withdrawal and advised von Manstein he would transfer divisions from France to the Ukraine.

As it happened, the Soviets took Voronezh on 26 January, and Kursk on 8 February, 1943.

In the Caucasus the race for Rostov proceeded. The Soviets outran their supply facilities and administrative skills. They possessed less than half the transport needed to bring up food, fuel, and ammunition to cut off the German forces at Rostov. When they took Rostov on 14 February, Kleist and his Army group A had already passed through. Kleist was promoted to field marshal as a result.

On 16 February the Soviets took Kharkov and Voroshilovgrad. In Kharkov the Soviets found the city population of 900,000 had been reduced to 300,000 inhabitants. The Germans had deported 12,000 to German labor camps and 70,000 to 80,000 had died of hunger and cold. Thirty thousand, including sixteen thousand Jews, had been slaughtered.

Soviet forces captured Pavlograd, 32 kilometers from the Dnieper River on 17 February. Kuznetson’s tanks arrived in the vicinity of von Manstein’s headquarters at Zaporozhye.

Sources: Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Soviet Setback after Stalingrad”, Geoffrey Jukes, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s