Bad weather conditions over the Bukrino bridgehead on the first of November restricted Second Air Army’s operations, allowing only 640 sorties in two days. The failure to expand the bridgehead at Bukrino caused a switch of the Soviet offensive to the Lyutezh bridgehead about 100 kilometers to the northwest on 3 November. This break through succeeded, allowing Soviet liberation of Kiev on 6 November, the anniversary of the of the revolution.
During the following months the Second Air Army concentrated on the destruction of enemy tanks and motorized infantry. The improvement of the weather during the period of 12 to 15 December allowed Second Air Army’s commitment of assets in large groups. By the end of operations around Kiev on 23 December the Second Air Army completed 20,000 sorties destroying 300 enemy aircraft.
During the battles around Bukrino and Lyutezh bridgeheads Soviet and German aircraft operated in approximately equal numbers. At the end of operations in the Kursk area the Germans possessed 1,460 operational aircraft, while the Second, Fifth, Seventeenth and Eighth Air Armies operated 2,360 machines in the same area.
The offensive to liberate the west bank of the Dnieper began on 24 December, 1943. In three days the Soviet Army overran Radomishlem, a German strong point. By 30 December the First Ukrainian Front salient expanded into an area 300 kilometers wide and 100 kilometers deep. The Germans reacted by concentrating assets in the Vinitsa region. German reinforcements of aircraft allowed them to achieve a two to one advantage over Soviet aircraft.
The Second Air Army, now under the command of General S. A. Krasovsky, struck back, flying 4,200 sorties, including 2,500 against tanks. As January 1944 advanced, the First and Second Ukrainian Fronts moved to surround enemy forces in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area, coordinating attacks with the Third and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts to the south.
From 12 to 25 January the Second and Fifth Air Armies concentrated on enemy defensive points. Together the two air armies operated 768 aircraft and were opposed by a thousand enemy machines. The spring thaw brought bad weather putting many undeveloped airfields out of operation. Aerial operations took place in formations of four to eight aircraft under ceilings of 100 to 150 meters.
In spite of the mud and rain the Korsun pocket was closed on 28 January. Second and Fifth Air Armies flew 2,800 sorties from 29 January to 3 February assisting troops struggling to keep the pocket closed. The Germans attempted to supply their troops by air. Second Air Army and the AFLRO flew blockade operations while the Fifth Air Army supported Soviet front line troops. German counter attacks in the Tolmach and Lisyanka regions took place in frequent heavy rain which dissolved dirt roads to impassability. The enemy were forced back along much of the Dnieper.
Beginning 4 March Second Air Army supported the First Ukrainian Front in the area of Proskurov-Chevnovtsy. Weather restricted operations to single or pairs of aircraft striking resistance points, and artillery and mortar batteries. Over the next three days weather improved to the point where operations could take place using six to eight aircraft. When the First Ukrainian Front resumed the offensive on 21 March the Second Air Army assisted the First and Fourth Tank Armies in driving the Germans from their defensive positions.
Sources: The Soviet Air Force in World War II, edited by Ray Wagner and Translated by Leland Fetzer, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1973
Battle for the Dnieper, Grigory Utkin, World War II Magazine, 1970s
Jack Kruse, Author 