Von Manstein’s Relief Attempt

With Stalingrad surrounded, the Soviet Army’s next move tightened the noose. Southwest Front’s 21st Army headed east and crossed the Don on 27 November. Don Front’s 65th Army headed east toward Vertyachiy and Peskovatka. Stalingrad Front’s 4th Tank Army struck northeast to Kalach to meet up with 26th Tank Corps encircling German forces across the Don.

Remnants of III Rumanian Army fell back to the Chir River forming a defensive line between the mouth of the Chir and Vershenskaya railway station in conjunction with the IV Rumanian Army and German troops. XVII Army Corps positioned themselves between the Chir and Krivaya Rivers near Dubovskoe.

XLVIII Panzer Corps occupied the gap between the III Rumanian Army and XVII Army Corps. Army Group Don set up a defensive position between Army Groups A and B. This included Operational Group Hollidt and IV Panzer Army.

Von Manstein intended to relieve von Paulus’ forces. The plan was called Operation Winter Storm. German forces on the Chir River near Nizhne-Chirskaya were only 65 kilometers from von Paulus’ forces. Colonel General Hoth, in Kotelnikovo, was only 120 kilometers away, but in a better position for penetration through the Soviet forces to link up with the surrounded VI Army. Von Manstein intended XLVIII Panzer Corps of Operational Group Hollidt as the spearhead.

By 29 November the area occupied by VI Army had been reduced by half.

On the Soviet side, a new offensive called Saturn was in the planning stage. Southwest Front, reinforced with 1st Guards Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Kuznetsov, and the left wing of the Voronezh Front, would attack the Italian VIII Army on the middle Don between Novaya Kalitva and Vershinskaya, and enemy forces on the Chir River and around Tormosin. The attack would then proceed south toward Millerovo and Rostov.

Meanwhile, 5th Tank Army worked to wear down German forces on the Chir River line.

Major General Hermann Balck, commander of IX Panzer Division raced north from Rostov to attack Soviet forces surrounding Stalingrad. On 7 December he encountered two Soviet tank brigades at State Farm 79. After nightfall, Balck left a blocking force, circled around the Soviet armored force and attacked them from the north destroying 53 tanks. He then received notification of a Soviet bridgehead across the Chir River. He eliminated that bridgehead, but the Soviets now had many of them across the Chir.

On 8 December STAVKA ordered 5th Shock Army, Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, to attack between 51st Army, Stalingrad Front, and 5th Tank Army, Southwest Front, in preparation for an attack on von Paulus’ forces.

Operation Winter Storm began on 12 December when Colonel General Hoth’s forces attacked out of Kotelnikovo. His 13 divisions were opposed by the Soviet 5th Shock and the 51st Army’s eight rifle divisions, permanent fortifications, two mechanized and two cavalry corps, four tank brigades, eight artillery and mortar regiments, and two regiments of rocket artillery.

There was hope that the Hoth Group could make contact with von Paulus’ VI Army by driving northeast toward Stalingrad along the railway. VI and XXIII Panzer Divisions with cavalry and infantry made a breakthrough trying to link up with VI Army southwest of Tundutovo Station. They were opposed by the 126th and 302nd Rifle Divisions of the 51st Army.

Exploiting the German’s superiority in tanks and aircraft, VI Panzer Division reached the southern bank of the Aksey River. XXIII Panzer Division penetrated north of Nebekovo.

Sources: Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Stalingrad: The Relief,” Colonel Alexander M. Samsonov, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

Prokhorovka: Part 1

World War II, Eastern Front, Russian and German Battle for the Kursk Salient.

The climax of the battle for the Kursk Salient took place near the city of Prohorovka on 12 July 1943. After the Allied landing on Sicily on 10 July Hitler gave tentative approval for the continuation of the drive on Kursk, but everyone involved in the decision knew that the resources needed to meet both threats exceeded Germany’s capabilities.

By now II SS Panzer Corps possessed fewer than 300 armored vehicles and III Panzer Corps had fewer than 200. General Rotmistrov’s 5 Guards Tank Army had five corps with a total of 830 tanks and self-propelled guns. The long eastern flank held by II SS Panzer Corps absorbed much of the armored vehicles of both armies, so the number of tanks, tank destroyers, and self-propelled guns involved in the action at Prokhorovka probably did not exceed 570.

General von Manstein’s orders for 12 July directed 48 Panzer Corps to capture the Psel River crossings south of Oboyan.  III Panzer Corp and Army Group Kempf were to move north to divert Soviet forces from Prokhorovka and, if possible, to join with II SS Panzer Corps to surround the Soviet forces in the pocket between them. II SS Panzer Corps was ordered to move northeast the last few kilometers to take Prokhorovka.

General Vatutin ordered attacks all along the front. Tenth Tank Corps was ordered to move down both sides of the Oboyan road with 100 tanks. Additional forces, including 70 tanks, were directed to strike Grossdeutschland from the west attacking toward Syrtzewo and Lukhanino. On the east General Vatutin ordered General Rotmistrov, commanding the 5th Guards Tank Army, to attack II SS Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps while holding 212 tanks in reserve.

The heat and humidity of the previous days continued. Increasing clouds and light showers did not initially interfere with movement. German operations began at dawn. In the southeast 6th Panzer Division drove north to take Rzhavets, immediately sending forces across to the northern bank of the Donets by 0500 hours.  The 19th Panzer Division advanced along the south bank of the Donets to take Krivisovo. Vatutin, recognizing the danger to the Prokhorovka position, directed Rotmistrov to send his reserves to the northern Donets to block that threat. Luftwaffe fighters cleared the skies at 0630 and bombers began close support all along the front beginning at 0700. This air activity attracted Soviet fighter response.

The Soviet creeping artillery barrage began at 0810 hours in preparation for Vatutin’s assaults scheduled for 0900.

Sources: David M. Glantz & Jonathan M. House, The Battle of Kursk, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS, 1999

Ludwig Heinrich Dyck, “Showdown a Krokhorovka and Oboian”, WW II History, September 2006

George M. Nipe, Jr., “Ribbentrop at Prokhorovka”, WW II History, July 2009