‘Operation Winter Storm’ kicked off on 12 December, 1942. When the spearhead got close enough to the VI Army, holding Stalingrad, a code word, ‘Thunderclap,’ authorized von Paulus to attempt a breakout from the pocket.

At 0515 General Hoth launched VI Panzer Division’s attack at Kotelnikovo. The first two days they advanced 19 kilometers per day against light opposition reaching the Aksay River escorting 800 trucks loaded with supplies for von Paulus’ troops.

The XXIII Panzer Division attacked the Soviet 302 Rifle Division on 13 December at Biriukov Railway Station. The 13^th Mechanized Corps, supported by 30 Il-2 Stumoviks of the Eighth Air Army, blunted the attack preventing the outflanking of the Soviet 126^th Rifle Division.

The VI Panzer Division secured a bridgehead over the Aksay River at Zalivskoye. XXIII Panzer Division secured a second bridgehead at Kruglyakovo.

Further south a three day battle began on 14 December with a Soviet attack out of the Kalmyk Steppe.

The Soviet 4 Mechanized Corps pushed the Germans out of Verkhne-Kumsky farmstead on 15 December and back to the Aksay River. By 17 December the 2^nd Guards Army concentrated north of the Myshkova defense line between Nizhne Kumsky and Kapinsky by 18 December.

On 17 December the German’s renewed their attack at Verkhne-Kumsky. Tanks, motorized infantry and air support pushed from the Aksay River toward the Myskoya River attacking the 87^th Rifle Division, the 4^th Cavalry Division, and the 4^th Mechanized Corp.

XVII Panzer Division forced the lower Aksay River at Generalovsky on 18 December and, on 19 December pushed 3^rd Guards Division out of the collective farm at Verkhne-Kunsky joining VI Panzer Division.

Here the Soviet 4^th Mechanized Corps held the German attack. The 4^th Mechanized Corps was awarded guards status, becoming the 3^rd Guards Mechanized Corps for this action.

On 16 December the Voronezh Front launched their offensive against the VIII Italian Army, Operational Group Hollidt, and III Rumanian Army. During the three day battle the Soviets advanced south and southeast, the 17^th Tank Corps taking Kantemirovka on 19 December.

The 2^nd Guards Army arrived from Stalingrad to take up a position on the defensive line along the Myshkova’s north bank.

VI Panzer division reached a point 24 kilometers short of the Myshkovo River when it engaged 300 Soviet tanks at 400 meters range and destroyed 34 T-34 tanks. It reached the Myskovo River on 19 December.

General Hoth had reached a point only 35 to 40 kilometers from the German troops in Stalingrad. The Aksay River was 23 meters wide at that point. Field Marshal von Manstein felt this was the time for von Paulus to make his breakout. Radio communications between the two Field Marshals was blocked by the Russians, so von Manstein sent his intelligence chief, Major Eismann into Stalingrad by Fiesler Storch.

Major Eismann met von Paulus chief of staff, General Schmidt on 19 December. General Schmidt advised Major Eismann that von Paulus required the ‘Thunderclap’ order authorizing the VI Army to breakout to be issued by Hitler. General Schmitt assured Eismann that VI Army could hold Stalingrad until Easter.

On 23 December von Manstein authorized General Hoth to withdraw from the Myshkova River line.

Sources: Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Stalingrad: The Relief,” Colonel Alexander M. Samsonov, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

The Germans did not have this battle all their own way. In the southern part of the city one defense line still held. Its strong point was the grain elevator. The first German attack on 16 September erupted in a savage firefight. On 18 September the fighting entered the elevator itself. Soon the grain caught fire and the fighting took place in thick smoke.

In the north the Soviets counterattacked on 19 September. The battle raged for two days. Each night Soviet Po-2 biplanes bombed the enemy flying 600 sorties.

On 20 September the Germans attacked the grain elevator using tanks. Soviet resistance broke two days later and the grain elevator fell to the Germans in spite of air attacks directed from the ground using rockets, smoke signals and tracers to indicate targets.

The Air Force for Long Range Operations (AFLRO) attacked German airfields. Flights of fighter aircraft, operating as hunters, drove enemy aircraft out of their forward airfields.

By 27 September the battle shifted to the residential and factory districts.

The 16^th Air Army had 232 aircraft, 152 of them serviceable. This included 13 night bombers, down from 31 after their previous work.

Most of the southern and central parts of Stalingrad had fallen to the Germans. Only the northern factory district held out. The Germans had suffered 7,700 dead and 31,000 wounded. The Russians lost 80,000 casualties.

On 2 October General von Paulus renewed his attacks on the northern factory district. Aerial and artillery bombardment exploded the oil reserves at the Red October Ordnance Factory. Burning oil poured into General Chuikov’s headquarters dugout. Tanks and infantry attacked the Red October factory, the Barricades Plant, and the Tractor Factory. Fighting extended into the plants, the cellars, and the sewers. The German soldiers, assisted by Stukas, advanced their front toward the Volga by more than 400 meters by 8 October.

On 14 October General von Paulus began his ‘Final Offensive.’ Three infantry divisions and two tank regiments took parts of the Tractor Factory and surrounded the rest. By 23 October half of the Red October fell and most of the Barricades was taken.

From 27 through 29 October the 8^th Air Army and the AFLRO raided and damaged thirteen German airfields in 502 sorties. During the month of October 260 mass air battles occurred in the Stalingrad area. The Luftwaffe lost eleven percent of their aircraft in four months of fighting.

From 1 September to 1 November only five Soviet infantry divisions crossed the Volga into Stalingrad. At the same time 27 fresh infantry divisions and 19 armored brigades were activated. These forces were concentrated between Saratov and Povorino, northwest of Stalingrad and received training and combat experience.

By 7 November General von Paulus held 90% of Stalingrad, but it was no longer a town.

Sources: Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Stalingrad: The Onslaught,” Alan Clark, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

The Soviet Air Force in World War II, Edited by Ray Wagner, Translated by Leland Fetzer, Doubleday & Company Inc., Garden City, NY, 1973

War Over the Steppes: The Air Campaigns on the Eastern Front 1941—45, E. R. Hooton, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, U.K.,2016

With Kursk, Kharkov, and Sevastopol taken, Hitler’s eyes turned to the oil fields of the Caucasus. The General Staff ordered Field Marshall von Bock to send General Herman Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army from Kursk to Voronezh on the Don River. Second Army followed them.

Lieutenant General Friedrich von Paulus’ Sixth Army, with eleven divisions, and General Stumme’s 40^th Panzer Corps attacked from Kharkov northeast to Voronezh to trap the Soviet armies between the Oskol and the Don Rivers.

These actions began on 28 July, 1942.

STAVKA noted the high concentration of armor in the south, but with the renewal of the attack on Leningrad, they estimated the German southern action could be directed through Yelets and Tula toward Moscow. Any reserves in the south, moved toward Moscow, could be trapped. They ordered Marshal Timoshenko to maintain two ‘hinges.’ One at Voronezh and the other at Rostov to threaten the German’s southern flank.

By 30 June, the German thrust from Kursk reached the halfway point to Voronezh, meeting no resistance.

STAVKA ordered 40^th Army to fight at Voronezh while Timoshenko fell back on Stalingrad.

Hitler flew to von Bock’s headquarters on 3 July. He advised von Bock to bypass Voronezh and go south instead. On 4 July that order was reversed. Von Bock was to take Voronezh despite the occupation of the city by the 40^th Army.

Hoth’s panzers reached Voronezh, straddling the city on 5 July. STAVKA, meanwhile, established the Voronezh Front on the same day, naming General Vatutin as commander, reporting directly to Moscow, rather than to Timoshenko.

By 12 July the Soviets woke to the threat of the German advance. The Stalingrad Front was established naming the 63^rd, 21^st, 62^nd, and 64^th Armies as its compliment. General Chuikov, commander of the 64^th Army, located at Tula, advised the Soviet command he could not reach his required position before 23 July. Air support for the Stalingrad Front was the 8^th Air Army commanded by T. T. Khryukin.

Von Bock’s forces cleared Voronezh on 13 July and Hitler ordered his advance on Stalingrad, sealing off the city with one arm, while the other would capture Rostov near the Sea of Azov.

Soviet air operations supporting the 62^nd and 64^th Armies on the Chir and Tsimlya Rivers began on 17 July. The long range bombing operation concentrated on German crossings over the Chir and Don Rivers. The 8^th Air Army possessed 300 aircraft consisting of 150 to 200 long range aircraft, and 50 to 60 fighters of the 102^nd Fighter Air Division and the Air Defense Force. This opposed the Luftwaffe‘s 1,200 aircraft.

Von Kleist’s First Panzer Army, originally directed as the southern prong against Stalingrad, was now ordered straight to Rostov. Herman Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army, originally to stiffen von Paulus’ Sixth Army was now ordered to assist von Kleist.

When Field Marshal von Bock protested, wanting to use Weich’s unit and part of von Paulus’ to deal with Vatutin at Voronezh, he was sacked. Weich’s forces were to guard the Don River from Voronezh to the Don bend.

Sources: Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

“Drive to the Don,” Alan Clark, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

The Soviet Air Force in World War II, Edited by Ray Wagner, Translated by Leland Fetzer, Doubleday & Company Inc., Garden City, NY, 1973

The defenses of Sevastopol consisted of three lines. The first line, one and a half to three kilometers deep, was made up of trenches, tank obstacles, and mine fields. The second line was a kilometer and a half deep north of the city. Maxim Gorki I, north of the city near the Belbek River, was 300 meters long, 40 meters deep and held 300 millimeter guns.

South of the city a second line, the Zapun line, on the Zapun heights included thirteen fortresses or strong points. Maxim Gorki II, located six and a half kilometers south of the city was similar to Maxim Gorki I.

It took the Germans two days to break through the first line of defenses. They then concentrated on reducing Fortress Stalin several kilometers behind the line of defenses. They captured that fortress on 13 June.

The battle for Maxim Gorki I continued. This fortress controlled the Belbek River down to the Black Sea more than five and a half kilometers away. Barrages of one ton shells opened the gun emplacements. Once the Germans infiltrated the fortress the battles continued underground until 17 June when the fortress was taken. Four other fortresses fell the same day.

During the fighting both sides took heavy losses. XLVI Infantry Division reinforced the German attackers. In the second half of June units from XVII Army, operating in the Donbass region, were sent. The Soviets received no replacements and suffered shortages of ammunition. By the end of June artillery fired only at short range targets. There was much hand-to-hand combat.

The Germans reached Severnaya Bay north of Sevastopol city on 18 June. This bay, 970 meters wide, separated the Germans from the city. On 20 June they infiltrated North Fortress, located in the German rear, from the sea. That gone, the Soviets retreated to the south shore of Severnaya Bay on 23 June.

South of the Sevastopol City the Germans elected to outflank the Zapun defense lines on the Zapun Heights by attacking the Inkerman highway beside the Chernaya River. Inside the mountain was a Soviet armaments factory. On 28 June the Germans crossed the Chernaya River to attack the arms factory. The Soviets elected to blow up the factory and themselves.

On the night of 28/29 June the Germans launched an attack across Severnaya Bay in assault boats.  In the south they launched an attack from the Fedyukhim Heights southeast of Sevastopol toward Zapun Mountain. The Soviet defenses were broken and the Soviet began evacuation to Cape Khersones on the western end of the Crimea by water. Some escaped into the mountains. Military leaders and some of the wounded were evacuated by submarine. Aircraft of the Sevastopol Defense Force were moved to airfields in the Caucasus.

The inner city was bombarded by the Germans on 1 July. The remaining Soviets surrendered on 3 July. The Germans took more than 100,000 prisoners.

Sources: ‘The Siege of Savastopol,’ Colonel Vasili Morozov, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

As part of Army Group South’s operations in Ukraine, the German 11^th Army and the Romanian 3^rd and 4^th Armies invaded Crimea on 26 September, 1941, through the Isthmus of Perikop. The Soviet 51^st Army and the Black Sea Fleet proved unable to prevent the occupation of Crimea by the Germans. Kerch and the Kerch Peninsula were lost and the Soviets were pushed across the Kerch Strait to the Taman Peninsula.

Sevastapol, though isolated, avoided conquest. Army Group A took over occupation duties. The Balaklava Hills south of Sevastopol were taken 30 October, 1941. In mid-December the German’s second offensive took place and they pushed to within eight kilometers of the city.

At the end of 1941 the Soviets retook Kerch with an amphibious operation and the German attack on Sevastopol was called back to oppose them.

General von Manstein, commanding the offensive against Kerch, examined the Soviet defenses and found an anti-tank ditch nearly four meters deep and ten meters wide filled with water, and guarded by a field of mines, barbed wire obstacles and pillboxes.

On 8 May, 1942, Manstein’s first attack, of three divisions with Luftflotte IV support, was on the stronger northern flank. This feint was pushed back. The main attack took place on the weaker southern front. Assault boats entered the anti-tank ditch from the Black Sea. Portal bridges, thrown across the ditch, allowed assault troops to advance. By 17 May the battle was over. One hundred seventy thousand Russian soldiers were captured, as well as 250 tanks, and 1,100 artillery pieces.

The remainder of the Soviet forces again withdrew to the Taman Peninsula. Eighty-six thousand soldiers were evacuated, including twenty-six thousand wounded. The reasons given for the loss included lack of communication and leadership.

During the winter of 1941-42 Sevastopol underwent continuous shelling and bombing. The defenders of the fortress of Sevastopol were commanded by General I. E. Petrov’s Coastal Army with seven rifle divisions, four brigades, two Marine regiments, two tank battalions and an armored train: 106,000 men, 600 guns, 100 mortars, 38 tanks, and 55 aircraft.

The German forces numbered ten infantry divisions and 120 batteries of guns: 204,000 men, fifty-six heavy guns of 190 to 420 mm, super heavy 615 mm mortars, and 800 mm railway guns, 670 lighter guns of 76 to 420 mm, 655 anti-tank guns, 720 mortars, 450 tanks and 600 aircraft. The Naval blockade possessed 19 motor torpedo boats, 30 patrol boats, eight anti-submarine boats, and 150 anti-shipping aircraft.

The bombardment began on 2 June. The first infantry attacks began on 7 June with the main assault against the Kamyshly-Belbec sector with an auxiliary attack from the south, up the Yalta highway. Luftwaffe supported with 600 to 1,000 sorties per day.

Sources: ‘The Siege of Savastopol,’ Colonel Vasili Morozov, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

Red Army Resurgent, John Shaw and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Time-Life Books, Inc., Chicago, IL, 1979

The Soviet winter offensive in the south began on 18 January, 1942. Southwest Front’s 6^th and 57^th Armies attacked the Germans on a line between Balakleya and Slavyansk advancing 26 kilometers. The 37^th Army made advances south of Slavyansk but were unable to penetrate the German defenses. 1^st and 5^th Cavalry assisted 57^th Army’s advance to take Barvenkovo on 24 January. 6^th Army turned north toward Kharkov.

An ad hoc German unit, ‘Mackensen’ Group, blocked the Soviet 57^th Army north of Krasnoarmeyskoye. 6^th, 57^th, and 9^th Armies with the assistance of a Cavalry Corps held a salient at Balakleya, Lozovanya, and Slavyansk 88 kilometers deep and 113 kilometers across. The attempt to defeat the Germans in the Donbass failed.

Against Army Group North the 2^nd Shock Army penetrated the German line moving toward Lyuban. This fighting continued through February. The salient gained there could not be extended or widened. Ultimately, the Germans surrounded Vlasov’s 2^nd Shock Army in March.

Returning to Army Group Center the Soviet 5^th and 33^rd Armies liberated Ruza, Mozhaysk, and Vereya on 20 January while the paratroops dropped on Zhelanye straddled the enemy routes to the rear. The Soviet 33^rd Army, assisted by cavalry blocked the Warsaw road on 27 January striking for Vyazma, but German forces restored their line along the Ugra River. This success cut off Soviet forces near Zhelanye. They continued to fight alongside the partisans until April.

Shortage of shells prohibited an artillery offensive on 14 February. STAVKA’s directive of 20 March insisted on a more energetic prosecution of the German-held Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Vyazma triangle. The spring thaw finally forced STAVKA to accept a defensive posture. It also allowed the Germans to attack the concentration of partisans near Zhelanye inflicting severe casualties on them.

The winter offensive smashed the myth of the invincibility of the German Army. German losses included 500,000 men, 1,300 tanks, 2,500 guns and 15,000 assorted vehicles.

For the Soviets, the block on the German advance allowed the completion of the transfer of most of Soviet industry to the east and production began ramping up.

By 1 May Hitler’s plans for the Soviet Union solidified. He focused on the southern sector. Donbas would be removed from the Soviet military/economic balance. Transportation on the Volga would be cut off. He intended a siege on oil supplies and a conquest of Stalingrad as a hold on the Soviet military forces. The taking of the Caucasus oilfields would draw Turkey into the war.

Additionally, psychological operations ensured Stalin believed the capture of Moscow remained of high importance in German strategy.

For the summer offensive the Soviet Army possessed 5,500,000 men, 5,000 tanks, 41,000 guns and 2,500 combat aircraft.

The Germans possessed 217 divisions, and 20 brigades at 89 to 90% strength, and three air fleets. This force consisted of 6,200,000 men, 57,000 guns, 3,200 tanks and assault guns, 3,400 combat aircraft, 300 surface ships, and 44 submarines.

The next phase of the battle was about to begin.

Sources: “The Russian Recovery,” John Erickson, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

“The Moscow Counterblow,” Marshal Zhukov, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s

“The Kharkov Offensives,” Colonel Vasili Morozov, History of the Second World War Magazine, 1970s