Prokhorovka Pt. 2

World War II, Eastern Front, Russian and German Battle for the Kursk Salient.

General Vatutin’s attacks began all along the front at 0900 hours as scheduled. General Rotmistrov’s 9th Airborne Division, with Second Guards Tank Corps on its left, struck south in the direction of Komsomolets State Farm against SS das Reich. Against SS Leibstandarte and SS Totenkopf, Rotmistrov threw the 18th and 29th Tank Corps. Rotmistrov believed II SS Panzer Corps possessed scores of Tiger tanks so he ordered his T-34s to attack at full speed, firing on the run, and ramming enemy tanks as necessary. In fact Leibstandarte had only four Tigers and das Reich had one. Totenkopf, on the north side of the Psel River, had ten.

The 18th and 29th Tank Corps raced down a five kilometer wide corridor between the Psel River and the ten meter high railroad embankment to the southeast. Armored vehicles from both sides intermingled firing at one another at point-blank range. Smoke, flames, dirt, and debris filled the air. Under heavy air attack the 29th Tank Corps withdrew briefly, then turned south to take Leibstandarte in the flank, threatening their rear. This threat caused Leibstandarte to withdraw in their turn toward Oktiabr’skii.

Simultaneously, the Soviet 181st Tank Brigade moved along the south bank of the Psel River against Totenkopf’s lines of communication driving Totenkopf’s panzer grenadiers before them.

By noon the German command realized they had failed to reach Prokhorovka. They directed Totenkopf to move along the north bank of the Psel River. A shock group of 100 tanks, supported by close air support, penetrated 52nd Guards Rifle Division’s defenses by 1300 hours.

Heavy rain showers moved into the area in mid-afternoon and the exhausted and emotionally drained units of both armies accepted a brief pause in the fighting.

To the south III Panzer Corps’ 19th Panzer Division, advancing along the south bank of the Northern Donets River, seized Krivitsevo in the late afternoon.

In the west, south of Oboyan, Soviet forces pushed the 3rd Panzer Division out of Werchopenje  and Berezovka into the eastern suburbs by 1700 hours. By this time 3rd Panzer Division possessed fewer than 40 tanks.

Meanwhile, in the center, the 95th Guards Rifle Division halted Totenkopf’s shock group at 1800 hours. Two hours later, under massive air support, Polezhaev was taken.

Sunset at 51 degrees north latitude takes place at 2011 hours on 12 July. By this time II SS Panzer Corps’ SS Leibstandarte captured hill 252.2 less than three kilometers from Prokhorovka. III Panzer Corps, unable to take Alexandrovka, remained 15 kilometers from Prokhorovka, failing to close the gap.

Thunderstorms ended all fighting after dark.

Sources: David M. Glantz & Jonathan M. House, The Battle of Kursk, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS, 1999

Ludwig Heinrich Dyck, “Showdown at Prokhorovka and Oboian”, WW II History, September 2006

George M. Nipe, Jr., “Ribbintrop at Prokhorovka”, WW II History, July 2009

Prokhorovka: Part 1

World War II, Eastern Front, Russian and German Battle for the Kursk Salient.

The climax of the battle for the Kursk Salient took place near the city of Prohorovka on 12 July 1943. After the Allied landing on Sicily on 10 July Hitler gave tentative approval for the continuation of the drive on Kursk, but everyone involved in the decision knew that the resources needed to meet both threats exceeded Germany’s capabilities.

By now II SS Panzer Corps possessed fewer than 300 armored vehicles and III Panzer Corps had fewer than 200. General Rotmistrov’s 5 Guards Tank Army had five corps with a total of 830 tanks and self-propelled guns. The long eastern flank held by II SS Panzer Corps absorbed much of the armored vehicles of both armies, so the number of tanks, tank destroyers, and self-propelled guns involved in the action at Prokhorovka probably did not exceed 570.

General von Manstein’s orders for 12 July directed 48 Panzer Corps to capture the Psel River crossings south of Oboyan.  III Panzer Corp and Army Group Kempf were to move north to divert Soviet forces from Prokhorovka and, if possible, to join with II SS Panzer Corps to surround the Soviet forces in the pocket between them. II SS Panzer Corps was ordered to move northeast the last few kilometers to take Prokhorovka.

General Vatutin ordered attacks all along the front. Tenth Tank Corps was ordered to move down both sides of the Oboyan road with 100 tanks. Additional forces, including 70 tanks, were directed to strike Grossdeutschland from the west attacking toward Syrtzewo and Lukhanino. On the east General Vatutin ordered General Rotmistrov, commanding the 5th Guards Tank Army, to attack II SS Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps while holding 212 tanks in reserve.

The heat and humidity of the previous days continued. Increasing clouds and light showers did not initially interfere with movement. German operations began at dawn. In the southeast 6th Panzer Division drove north to take Rzhavets, immediately sending forces across to the northern bank of the Donets by 0500 hours.  The 19th Panzer Division advanced along the south bank of the Donets to take Krivisovo. Vatutin, recognizing the danger to the Prokhorovka position, directed Rotmistrov to send his reserves to the northern Donets to block that threat. Luftwaffe fighters cleared the skies at 0630 and bombers began close support all along the front beginning at 0700. This air activity attracted Soviet fighter response.

The Soviet creeping artillery barrage began at 0810 hours in preparation for Vatutin’s assaults scheduled for 0900.

Sources: David M. Glantz & Jonathan M. House, The Battle of Kursk, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS, 1999

Ludwig Heinrich Dyck, “Showdown a Krokhorovka and Oboian”, WW II History, September 2006

George M. Nipe, Jr., “Ribbentrop at Prokhorovka”, WW II History, July 2009

Kursk: The Southern Pincer Part 3

One of the key battles on the Eastern Front between Germany and the Soviet Union was the Battle for the Kursk Salient.

Dawn comes early on the Ukrainian Steppes in July. On 10 July, 1943, at 0330 hours the 11th Panzer Division resumed its attack up the Oboyan Road with Gross Deutschland fighting on the left flank west of Werchopenje. Supported by heavy Luftwaffe effort Gross Deutschland took two hills west of the village despite Soviet counter attacks along the Pena River.

Leibstandarte, on II SS Panzer Corps’ left flank, during the night hours of 9/10 July, crossed behind Totenkopf heading for their new concentration points near Teterevino for their attack up the Prokhorovka Road south of the Psel River. Totenkopf, scheduled to kick off at dawn by crossing the Psel River to the north shore to provide flank support for Leibstandarte, found their attack stalled by Soviet opposition, causing General Hauser to delay Leibstandarte’s attack until 1000 hours. Leibstandarte received the go-ahead finally at 1045 hours and Totenkopf finally crossed the Psel River at noon.

By 1300 Leibstandarte cleared the Komsomolets State Farm and, amid scattered thunderstorms, continued east of the farm against dug-in Soviet tanks .

Das Reich, on II Panzer Corps’ right flank, made limited advances, crossing the rail line to Prokhorovka and taking a small village to the south of the city.

Late on 10 July General Hauser ordered the continuation of the attack on Prokhorovka for 11 July.

Shortly after nightfall Vatutin’s 9th Guards Airborne Division entered defensive positions east of Prokhorovka. 33rd Rifle Corps was positioned along the Psel River. General Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army reinforced by the 2nd Tank and 2nd Guards Tank Corps backed up this defensive line. These forces included 500 tanks and self-propelled guns.

Vatutin’s rearrangement of his forces was not completed by the morning of 11 July, when Leibstandarte began their advance up the Prokhorovka Road, backed up by the Luftwaffe, which gained a tenuous air superiority over the front. On the left flank Totenkopf expanded its bridgehead over the Psel river, but Das Reich failed to penetrate Vinogradovka, leaving Leibstandarte’s right flank uncovered.

The Soviet 9th Guards Airborne Division brought the German attack to a halt before an immense anti-tank ditch southeast of the Oktiabr’skii State Farm. Leibstandarte captured a hill in the midst of the Soviet defensive lines at 1310 hours, but their efforts reduced their forces to 60 tanks, 10 assault guns, and 20 tank destroyers.

Soviet attacks continued into the evening, but Leibstandarte smashed 2 Tank Corps’ defenses and drove a deep salient into the 9th Guards Airborne Division’s defenses by taking the Oktiabr’skii State Farm.

As evening fell both sides issued their orders for 12 July. 48th Panzer Corps was to take the Psel River crossing south of Oboyan. Army Group Kempf was to continue moving north along the Donets River while II SS Panzer Corps was to move the last few kilometers to Prokhorovka.

General Vatutin ordered General Rotmistrov to attack at 0300 hours on 12 July. 100 tanks were to attack southeast between the Psel River and the Oktiabr’skii State Farm toward the Komsomolets State Farm. An additional 191 tanks mustered in the southern suburbs of Prokhorovka were to attack between the Oktiabr’skii State Farm and Storzhevoe and 120 tanks were to attack Das Reich east of Belenikhino along the rail line.

The scene was set for the climax of the largest tank and air battle of the Second World War.

Sources: Geoffrey Jukes, Kursk: The Clash of Armour, Ballantine Books, Inc., New York, 1969;
David M. Glantz & Jonathan M. House, The Battle of Kursk, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS, 1999

Author: Jack Kruse writes military historical fiction set in World War II. He is currently completing a novel, tentatively titled Cauldron, about the aerial battle of the Kursk Salient, a key confrontation on the Russian front in which German and Soviet fighters and bombers engaged in an intensive series of engagements over the steppes of the Ukraine.

Kursk: The Southern Pincer Part 2

The Soviet flank attacks across the Pena River against Syrtzewo and Werchopenye attracted German attention. On 8 July the 6th Panzer Regiment was ordered to cross the Pena River and, using assault and anti-tank guns, turn south behind the Soviet 71st Guards Rifle Division. To prepare for this attack German pioneers repaired the bridge over the Pena River at Werchopenye on 9 July.

Meanwhile, the 48th Panzer Corps advanced up the Oboyan Road with Grossdeutschland west of the road and 11th Panzer Division east of the road. All available air power was ordered to provide close support. The attack met very strong Soviet resistance provided by the 6th Tank Corps with the support of the infantry of the 9th Guards Rifle Division. By noon the 48th Panzer Corps reached the high ground south of Oboyan, however, they were not able to take Novoselovka by the end of the day.

Thirteen kilometers to the east II SS Panzer Corps continued to attack north toward Kursk with Totenkopf in the van, Leibstandarte on the west flank and Das Reich holding the east flank assisted by the 167th Infantry Division. By this time General Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army had positioned itself in front of the German attack holding the line between Oboyan and just northeast of Prokhorovka, harassing Das Reich on the Prokhorovka Road with the assistance of the 2nd Tank Corps.

By the end of 9th July Totenkopf had reached the Psel River and captured Krasnyi Octiabr. Leibstandarte had crossed the Solotinka River and linked up with the 11th Panzer Division. Army Detachment Kempf, assigned to protect II SS Panzer Corps right flank was now held up nearly 45 kilometers to the southeast by the Soviet 7th Guards Army holding well dug in positions in the Belgorod area.

Soviet General Vatutin shifted forces to his right flank to hold Grossdeutschland’s drive toward Oboyan, depending on the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 69th Army to hold the left flank.

At this point, late on the afternoon of July 9, German General Hoth decided to alter the heading of the II SS Panzer Corps from north toward Kursk to the northeast toward Prokhorovka. He felt that, with the SS Corps and concentrated air support, he could smash the armored threat to his east flank, unlock III Panzer Corps of Army Detachment Kempf and break through the Soviet defenses. With that breakthrough Model’s 9th Army of the northern pincer could resume its attack to complete the encirclement of the Kursk Salient.

Author: Jack Kruse writes military historical fiction set in World War II. He is currently completing a novel, tentatively titled Cauldron, about the aerial battle of the Kursk Salient, a key confrontation on the Russian front in which German and Soviet fighters and bombers engaged in an intensive series of engagements over the steppes of the Ukraine.

Kursk: Southern Pincer Pt. 1

On the evening of 6 July General Vatutin, commander of the Voronezh front, requested four fresh tank corps and two aviation corps. Stavka, the Soviet high command told Vatutin he needed to use his existing forces. However, they authorized two tank corps for his use, to be available on 8 July.

In the meantime, Stalin ordered Gerneral Konev, commander of the Steppe Front to move the 5th Guards Tank Army forward to the Staryi Oskol area to protect Kursk. They would also be in position by 8 July.

Using the existing second line of defense previously prepared, Vatutin positioned the First Tank Army’s 31st Tank Corps on II SS Panzer Corps right flank, while the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps would be positioned on the left flank. He depended on the 6th Tank and the 3rd Mechanized Corps to stop 48th Panzer Corps’ drive on Oboyan. Voronezh Front’s air power would be used to protect Oboyan while the Southwest Front’s air power would be used against German forces east of Belgorod.

Early on 7 July Hoth’s II Panzer Corps resumed its attack on the Pena and Lukhanino Rivers. The German tanks forced Vatutin to make a second request that Stavka allow him to dig in his tanks into the defensive positions, rather than launch an armored attack. This time Stavka allowed him to do so.

Leibstandarte’s First SS Panzer Regiment, First Panzergrenadier Regiment, and SS Das Reich pushed up the Prokhorovka road, peeling off two panzer grenadier regiments to cover their extended flanks.

On 8 July 500 German tanks with supporting infantry and artillery struck toward Oboyan. With Luftwaffe support Grossdeutschland broke into Syrtzewo just after noon, then continued their attack toward Werchopenye.

A Soviet counter attack from the flank near Werchopenye allowed the Soviets to reach the Pena River at Syrtzewo and Werchopenye by evening. As a result, Vatutin ordered his forces to prepare new defenses north of Werchopenye and across the Oboyan road to the Psel River.

In the east II SS Panzer Corps reoriented its attack away from Prokhorovka and toward Kursk, unaware that Vatutin had already commanded his forces to fall back in that area, while setting up an attack down the Prokhorovka road against II SS Panzer Corps. Vatutin’s attack went in piecemeal against SS Totenkopf’s and Das Reich’s advances. As the day progressed, with assistance from Hs 129 anti-tank aircraft armed with 30 mm cannon, Vatutin’s attack was blunted.

Orders for Grossdeutschland  for 9 July were to take the high ground south of Oboyan and wheel to the west to drive the Soviet forces out of Werchopenye. In the east Hausser’s II SS Panzer Corps was to continue its drive north toward Kursk, spearheaded by 283 tanks and assault guns.

Source: The Battle of Kursk, David M. Glantz & Jonathan M. House, University Press of Kansas, 1999

Author: Jack Kruse writes military historical fiction set in World War II. He is currently completing a novel, tentatively titled Cauldron, about the aerial battle of the Kursk Salient, a key confrontation on the Russian front in which German and Soviet fighters and bombers engaged in an intensive series of engagements over the steppes of the Ukraine.

Kursk: The Northern Pincer

As Model’s attack against Rokossovsky’s Central Front developed, the Second and Ninth Panzer Divisions became engaged in a massive tank battle west of Ponyri Station. The Russian 29th Rifle Corps’ 307th Rifle Division blocked the Panzer drive. This four-day battle cost Model heavily. He lost 20% of his armored striking force on the first day alone. Model continued to push against the second defense belt at Ponyri. Repeated thrusts were repelled; however by the evening of 6 July, 1943, the Germans succeeded in taking the western half of Ponyri.

Model’s attack toward Ol’kovatka to the west was expanded on 8 July by the addition of the Second Panzer Division. Repeated attacks against the 17th Guards Rifle Corps failed to take the city. The Soviets had adopted a ‘stand or perish’ philosophy that seemed to enhance their defenses.

At Ponyri the reinforcement of the attack by the addition of the Tenth Panzer Grenadier Division began to make encroachment against the frantic Soviet opposition. However, it was a Pyrrhic victory. Early on the morning of 11–12 July the Western and Bryansk fronts probed the Orel salient. With the success of the morning probe, General Bagramian, part of Sokolovsky’s Western Front, committed the First and Fifth Tank Corps. These thrusts south from Ul’ianovo threatened to take Model in the rear and cut his supply lines.

Recognizing the threat, Model withdrew four divisions from his attack to meet the new threat. After an advance of barely 18 kilometers, Model’s assault was foreclosed.

Sources: “Kursk: The Clash of Armour”, Colonel G. A. Koltunov, History of World War Two Magazine; The Battle of Kursk, David M. Glantz & Jonathan M. House, University Press of Kansas, 1999

Author: Jack Kruse writes military historical fiction set in World War II. He is currently completing a novel, tentatively titled Cauldron, about the aerial battle of the Kursk Salient, a key confrontation on the Russian front in which German and Soviet fighters and bombers engaged in an intensive series of engagements over the steppes of the Ukraine.

Kursk: The Battle Begins

German forces on the southern edge of the Kursk bulge began reconnaissance in force in the late afternoon of 4 July, feeling out the Soviet defenses. To the east Grossdeutschland Grenadiers and the 11th Panzer Division also tested the Russians.

After midnight, in the midst of a thunderstorm, the Soviets began an artillery bombardment all along the front. Early on the morning of 5 July the Soviet Air Force launched its assaults on German air fields. German interceptors and anti-aircraft artillery claimed large numbers of Soviet aircraft. In spite of the exaggerated German claims, the Soviet air offensive had limited results.

In the north Model’s IXth Army began its artillery bombardment at 0430. The air attack began at 0510. The tank and infantry attack struck the Soviet 13th Army on a 40 kilometer front. Soviet resistance was assisted by the 16th Air Army. The northern forces were limited to an eight kilometers advance, breaking through the first Soviet defensive belt west of Ponyri.

In the south von Manstein’s forces, including Hoth’s IV Panzer Army and Operational Group Kempff’s III Panzer Corps, attacked the 6th Guard’s Army and the 7th Guards Army. The German attack included 700 tanks and was supported by 2,000 sorties by the Luftwaffe. By the end of the day Hausser’s SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and SS Totenkopf penetrated twenty kilometers creating a gap in the second defensive belt.

Sources: The Battle of Kursk, David M. Glantz & Jonathan M House, University of Kansas, 1999
‘Kursk: The Clash of Armour’, Colonel G. A. Koltunov, History of the Second World War Magazine

Author: Jack Kruse writes military historical fiction set in World War II. He is currently completing a novel, tentatively titled Cauldron, about the aerial battle of the Kursk Salient, a key confrontation on the Russian front in which German and Soviet fighters and bombers engaged in an intensive series of engagements over the steppes of the Ukraine.

Kursk: The Russian Preparations

The Russians knew the German intentions for the Kursk salient. A Russian spy ring, ‘Lucy’, revealed the plan to Stalin as early as 8 April, 1943. General Rokossovsky commanding Central Front issued orders for preparation of defenses south of Orel on 10 April. General Vatutin, commander of Voronezh Front, issued his orders on 12 April. The commanders expected the German assault in the second half of May, after the spring thaw. Marshal Zhukov presented the defensive plans to Stalin on the evening of 12 April, within 24 hours of arriving in Moscow.

Immediately civilians began preparations. Roads and railways in the expected combat area were built, or repaired. Anti-tank trenches eventually totaling 3,100 miles in length were dug. Three to six defensive belts, each with two to three layers were constructed in the areas most likely to be attacked. Defensive works included block houses and anti-tank strongpoints. Evacuated towns were incorporated into the defensive works which were intended to funnel and concentrate enemy armored vehicles into kill zones.

To the east of Kursk a solid line of defense was established to protect the rear areas in case of a German breakthrough. This Reserve Front, soon renamed Steppe Front was commanded by General Koniev. If the German attack was blunted, wearing itself out on the Russian defenses, the Reserve Front had orders for a counter offensive.

By June more than 300,000 civilians were employed to complete the defensive works. In the meantime, partisans and the air force conducted attacks all along the German supply lines. Eventually, these defensive works along the Central and Voronezh Fronts contained 1.3 million men, 19,794 artillery pieces and mortars, and 3,489 tanks and self-propelled guns. They were supported by 2,650 aircraft.

By early July the Russians awaited the German attack with anxious anticipation.

Kursk: The German Plan Delayed

The Kursk Bulge thrust westward out from the front line nearly 150 kilometers. Centered on Kursk, the bulge extended 280 kilometers north to south. The most obvious operation to eliminate the bulge and straighten the front line was concentric attacks from the north and south to pinch off the bulge at the base. The Germans expected to slice through the Soviet defenses, meet at Kursk itself and cut off and surround all Soviet forces within the bulge. The Germans used this technique effectively at Minsk, Smolensk and Kiev in the 1941 attacks. Hitler’s operational order, issued 15 April, 1943, outlined the plan, but no effective date was given. Hitler advised his generals to expect the execute order anytime after 1 May.

Hitler wanted significant numbers of the new Panzerkampfwagen V Panther, and the VI Tiger tanks for the planned attack. The weapon for the Tiger tank was the legendary 88 millimeter anti-tank gun,  and Hitler wanted the Tiger fitted with a longer barreled variant of the gun, but problems fitting the modified gun into the turret of the Tiger proved to be impossible. The answer was to place the longer barreled gun on a Porsche chassis yielding the Elephant. Hitler insisted that this weapon be made available for the Kursk offensive.

The initial start date of 1 May became 12 June, and then 1 July, then 3 July and finally 5 July. Even with these delays only 347 of the Panthers, Tigers, and Elephants were available out of a total of 1,866 armored vehicles available for use in the battle. The majority of the German tanks turned out to be Panzerkampfwagen IIIs and IVs. Both of these armored vehicles had been updated with improved armor and guns. The Mark IV was equivalent to the primary Soviet medium tank, the T-34 model 1943.

Source: The Battle of Kursk, David M. Glantz and Johathan M. House, University Press of Kansas, 1999