Kursk: The Battle Begins

German forces on the southern edge of the Kursk bulge began reconnaissance in force in the late afternoon of 4 July, feeling out the Soviet defenses. To the east Grossdeutschland Grenadiers and the 11th Panzer Division also tested the Russians.

After midnight, in the midst of a thunderstorm, the Soviets began an artillery bombardment all along the front. Early on the morning of 5 July the Soviet Air Force launched its assaults on German air fields. German interceptors and anti-aircraft artillery claimed large numbers of Soviet aircraft. In spite of the exaggerated German claims, the Soviet air offensive had limited results.

In the north Model’s IXth Army began its artillery bombardment at 0430. The air attack began at 0510. The tank and infantry attack struck the Soviet 13th Army on a 40 kilometer front. Soviet resistance was assisted by the 16th Air Army. The northern forces were limited to an eight kilometers advance, breaking through the first Soviet defensive belt west of Ponyri.

In the south von Manstein’s forces, including Hoth’s IV Panzer Army and Operational Group Kempff’s III Panzer Corps, attacked the 6th Guard’s Army and the 7th Guards Army. The German attack included 700 tanks and was supported by 2,000 sorties by the Luftwaffe. By the end of the day Hausser’s SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and SS Totenkopf penetrated twenty kilometers creating a gap in the second defensive belt.

Sources: The Battle of Kursk, David M. Glantz & Jonathan M House, University of Kansas, 1999
‘Kursk: The Clash of Armour’, Colonel G. A. Koltunov, History of the Second World War Magazine

Author: Jack Kruse writes military historical fiction set in World War II. He is currently completing a novel, tentatively titled Cauldron, about the aerial battle of the Kursk Salient, a key confrontation on the Russian front in which German and Soviet fighters and bombers engaged in an intensive series of engagements over the steppes of the Ukraine.

Kursk: The Russian Preparations

The Russians knew the German intentions for the Kursk salient. A Russian spy ring, ‘Lucy’, revealed the plan to Stalin as early as 8 April, 1943. General Rokossovsky commanding Central Front issued orders for preparation of defenses south of Orel on 10 April. General Vatutin, commander of Voronezh Front, issued his orders on 12 April. The commanders expected the German assault in the second half of May, after the spring thaw. Marshal Zhukov presented the defensive plans to Stalin on the evening of 12 April, within 24 hours of arriving in Moscow.

Immediately civilians began preparations. Roads and railways in the expected combat area were built, or repaired. Anti-tank trenches eventually totaling 3,100 miles in length were dug. Three to six defensive belts, each with two to three layers were constructed in the areas most likely to be attacked. Defensive works included block houses and anti-tank strongpoints. Evacuated towns were incorporated into the defensive works which were intended to funnel and concentrate enemy armored vehicles into kill zones.

To the east of Kursk a solid line of defense was established to protect the rear areas in case of a German breakthrough. This Reserve Front, soon renamed Steppe Front was commanded by General Koniev. If the German attack was blunted, wearing itself out on the Russian defenses, the Reserve Front had orders for a counter offensive.

By June more than 300,000 civilians were employed to complete the defensive works. In the meantime, partisans and the air force conducted attacks all along the German supply lines. Eventually, these defensive works along the Central and Voronezh Fronts contained 1.3 million men, 19,794 artillery pieces and mortars, and 3,489 tanks and self-propelled guns. They were supported by 2,650 aircraft.

By early July the Russians awaited the German attack with anxious anticipation.

Kursk: The German Plan Delayed

The Kursk Bulge thrust westward out from the front line nearly 150 kilometers. Centered on Kursk, the bulge extended 280 kilometers north to south. The most obvious operation to eliminate the bulge and straighten the front line was concentric attacks from the north and south to pinch off the bulge at the base. The Germans expected to slice through the Soviet defenses, meet at Kursk itself and cut off and surround all Soviet forces within the bulge. The Germans used this technique effectively at Minsk, Smolensk and Kiev in the 1941 attacks. Hitler’s operational order, issued 15 April, 1943, outlined the plan, but no effective date was given. Hitler advised his generals to expect the execute order anytime after 1 May.

Hitler wanted significant numbers of the new Panzerkampfwagen V Panther, and the VI Tiger tanks for the planned attack. The weapon for the Tiger tank was the legendary 88 millimeter anti-tank gun,  and Hitler wanted the Tiger fitted with a longer barreled variant of the gun, but problems fitting the modified gun into the turret of the Tiger proved to be impossible. The answer was to place the longer barreled gun on a Porsche chassis yielding the Elephant. Hitler insisted that this weapon be made available for the Kursk offensive.

The initial start date of 1 May became 12 June, and then 1 July, then 3 July and finally 5 July. Even with these delays only 347 of the Panthers, Tigers, and Elephants were available out of a total of 1,866 armored vehicles available for use in the battle. The majority of the German tanks turned out to be Panzerkampfwagen IIIs and IVs. Both of these armored vehicles had been updated with improved armor and guns. The Mark IV was equivalent to the primary Soviet medium tank, the T-34 model 1943.

Source: The Battle of Kursk, David M. Glantz and Johathan M. House, University Press of Kansas, 1999

Formation of the Kursk Salient

The battle for Stalingrad is one of the most familiar actions on the Eastern Front for most Americans. At the height of the fighting for Stalingrad, the Germans occupied the majority of the city. On November 19, 1942, the Soviet South-West Front, the Don Front, and the Stalingrad Front launched attacks from the northwest, the north, and the southeast of Stalingrad wrapping around the city and surrounding the VI Army led by General von Paulus. By November 23 the encirclement of VI Army was complete, and the Soviet siege began.

General Hoth attempted to penetrate the Soviet encircling force to relieve the VI Army, striking north from Kotelnikovo beginning on December 12. The relief attempt was brought to a halt on the Myshkova River by December 18. Even while the relief effort was taking place. The Voronezh Front under General Golikov, with the assistance of Vatutin’s South-West Front, attacked the Italian VIII Army and the Rumanian III Army, northwest of the city, opened a gap in the German line causing von Manstein to plug the hole with the replacements Hoth needed to continue his relief attempt.

On December 24 the South-West Front, the Don Front, and the Stalingrad Front attacked the stalled relief force taking Kotelnikovo on December 29 and driving Hoth’s forces back to the Aksay River. The time now seemed right for a general offensive by the Soviet Army. On January 13, 1943, from Orel in the north to Rostov on the Sea of Azov, the Bryansk Front, the Voronezh Front, the South-West Front, and the South Front surged forward. The Voronezh Front under General Golikov crossed the upper Don River and defeated the II Hungarian and VIII Italian Armies. General Vatutin took Voronezh on January 26.

General von Paulus surrendered the VI Army in Stalingrad on February 2, 1943.

The Soviet Army took Kursk on February 8, Kharkov and Voroshilovgrad on February 16, and Pavlograd, near Dnepropetrovsk on February 17. With Golikov attacking toward Kharkov and Vatutin advancing southwest toward Dnepropetrovsk, a gap opened in the Russian line of which von Manstein, the German commander, took advantage. On February 20 German forces attacked north from Krasnoarmeyskoye, and south from Krasnograd to cut off South-West Front’s spearhead attacking Dnepropetrovsk, while another assault from Poltava was thrust into the gap between the two Soviet armies aiming for Belgorod and Kharkov. With Vatutin retreating from von Manstein’s forces, Golikov’s left flank was exposed. He was able to move units south to cover his flank, but, ultimately he was forced to yield Kharkov, which the Germans took, again, on March 15, and Belgorod on March 18.

Manstein’s next planned move was to strike north toward Kursk, however, the spring thaw prevent it. The front stabilized on March 26 leaving a bulge in the line stretching west more than 100 miles, and 100 miles from north to south with Kursk very nearly in its center.

Sources: “Stalingrad: The Relief”, Colonel Alexander M. Samsonov, World War II Magazine; Kursk: the Clash of Armour, Geoffrey Jukes, Ballentine Books, 1968