Battles of the Russian Front

Prokhorovka Pt. 2

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World War II, Eastern Front, Russian and German Battle for the Kursk Salient.

General Vatutin’s attacks began all along the front at 0900 hours as scheduled. General Rotmistrov’s 9th Airborne Division, with Second Guards Tank Corps on its left, struck south in the direction of Komsomolets State Farm against SS das Reich. Against SS Leibstandarte and SS Totenkopf, Rotmistrov threw the 18th and 29th Tank Corps. Rotmistrov believed II SS Panzer Corps possessed scores of Tiger tanks so he ordered his T-34s to attack at full speed, firing on the run, and ramming enemy tanks as necessary. In fact Leibstandarte had only four Tigers and das Reich had one. Totenkopf, on the north side of the Psel River, had ten.

The 18th and 29th Tank Corps raced down a five kilometer wide corridor between the Psel River and the ten meter high railroad embankment to the southeast. Armored vehicles from both sides intermingled firing at one another at point-blank range. Smoke, flames, dirt, and debris filled the air. Under heavy air attack the 29th Tank Corps withdrew briefly, then turned south to take Leibstandarte in the flank, threatening their rear. This threat caused Leibstandarte to withdraw in their turn toward Oktiabr’skii.

Simultaneously, the Soviet 181st Tank Brigade moved along the south bank of the Psel River against Totenkopf’s lines of communication driving Totenkopf’s panzer grenadiers before them.

By noon the German command realized they had failed to reach Prokhorovka. They directed Totenkopf to move along the north bank of the Psel River. A shock group of 100 tanks, supported by close air support, penetrated 52nd Guards Rifle Division’s defenses by 1300 hours.

Heavy rain showers moved into the area in mid-afternoon and the exhausted and emotionally drained units of both armies accepted a brief pause in the fighting.

To the south III Panzer Corps’ 19th Panzer Division, advancing along the south bank of the Northern Donets River, seized Krivitsevo in the late afternoon.

In the west, south of Oboyan, Soviet forces pushed the 3rd Panzer Division out of Werchopenje  and Berezovka into the eastern suburbs by 1700 hours. By this time 3rd Panzer Division possessed fewer than 40 tanks.

Meanwhile, in the center, the 95th Guards Rifle Division halted Totenkopf’s shock group at 1800 hours. Two hours later, under massive air support, Polezhaev was taken.

Sunset at 51 degrees north latitude takes place at 2011 hours on 12 July. By this time II SS Panzer Corps’ SS Leibstandarte captured hill 252.2 less than three kilometers from Prokhorovka. III Panzer Corps, unable to take Alexandrovka, remained 15 kilometers from Prokhorovka, failing to close the gap.

Thunderstorms ended all fighting after dark.

Sources: David M. Glantz & Jonathan M. House, The Battle of Kursk, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS, 1999

Ludwig Heinrich Dyck, “Showdown at Prokhorovka and Oboian”, WW II History, September 2006

George M. Nipe, Jr., “Ribbintrop at Prokhorovka”, WW II History, July 2009

Prokhorovka: Part 1

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World War II, Eastern Front, Russian and German Battle for the Kursk Salient.

The climax of the battle for the Kursk Salient took place near the city of Prohorovka on 12 July 1943. After the Allied landing on Sicily on 10 July Hitler gave tentative approval for the continuation of the drive on Kursk, but everyone involved in the decision knew that the resources needed to meet both threats exceeded Germany’s capabilities.

By now II SS Panzer Corps possessed fewer than 300 armored vehicles and III Panzer Corps had fewer than 200. General Rotmistrov’s 5 Guards Tank Army had five corps with a total of 830 tanks and self-propelled guns. The long eastern flank held by II SS Panzer Corps absorbed much of the armored vehicles of both armies, so the number of tanks, tank destroyers, and self-propelled guns involved in the action at Prokhorovka probably did not exceed 570.

General von Manstein’s orders for 12 July directed 48 Panzer Corps to capture the Psel River crossings south of Oboyan.  III Panzer Corp and Army Group Kempf were to move north to divert Soviet forces from Prokhorovka and, if possible, to join with II SS Panzer Corps to surround the Soviet forces in the pocket between them. II SS Panzer Corps was ordered to move northeast the last few kilometers to take Prokhorovka.

General Vatutin ordered attacks all along the front. Tenth Tank Corps was ordered to move down both sides of the Oboyan road with 100 tanks. Additional forces, including 70 tanks, were directed to strike Grossdeutschland from the west attacking toward Syrtzewo and Lukhanino. On the east General Vatutin ordered General Rotmistrov, commanding the 5th Guards Tank Army, to attack II SS Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps while holding 212 tanks in reserve.

The heat and humidity of the previous days continued. Increasing clouds and light showers did not initially interfere with movement. German operations began at dawn. In the southeast 6th Panzer Division drove north to take Rzhavets, immediately sending forces across to the northern bank of the Donets by 0500 hours.  The 19th Panzer Division advanced along the south bank of the Donets to take Krivisovo. Vatutin, recognizing the danger to the Prokhorovka position, directed Rotmistrov to send his reserves to the northern Donets to block that threat. Luftwaffe fighters cleared the skies at 0630 and bombers began close support all along the front beginning at 0700. This air activity attracted Soviet fighter response.

The Soviet creeping artillery barrage began at 0810 hours in preparation for Vatutin’s assaults scheduled for 0900.

Sources: David M. Glantz & Jonathan M. House, The Battle of Kursk, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS, 1999

Ludwig Heinrich Dyck, “Showdown a Krokhorovka and Oboian”, WW II History, September 2006

George M. Nipe, Jr., “Ribbentrop at Prokhorovka”, WW II History, July 2009

Kursk: The Northern Pincer

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As Model’s attack against Rokossovsky’s Central Front developed, the Second and Ninth Panzer Divisions became engaged in a massive tank battle west of Ponyri Station. The Russian 29th Rifle Corps’ 307th Rifle Division blocked the Panzer drive. This four-day battle cost Model heavily. He lost 20% of his armored striking force on the first day alone. Model continued to push against the second defense belt at Ponyri. Repeated thrusts were repelled; however by the evening of 6 July, 1943, the Germans succeeded in taking the western half of Ponyri.

Model’s attack toward Ol’kovatka to the west was expanded on 8 July by the addition of the Second Panzer Division. Repeated attacks against the 17th Guards Rifle Corps failed to take the city. The Soviets had adopted a ‘stand or perish’ philosophy that seemed to enhance their defenses.

At Ponyri the reinforcement of the attack by the addition of the Tenth Panzer Grenadier Division began to make encroachment against the frantic Soviet opposition. However, it was a Pyrrhic victory. Early on the morning of 11–12 July the Western and Bryansk fronts probed the Orel salient. With the success of the morning probe, General Bagramian, part of Sokolovsky’s Western Front, committed the First and Fifth Tank Corps. These thrusts south from Ul’ianovo threatened to take Model in the rear and cut his supply lines.

Recognizing the threat, Model withdrew four divisions from his attack to meet the new threat. After an advance of barely 18 kilometers, Model’s assault was foreclosed.

Sources: “Kursk: The Clash of Armour”, Colonel G. A. Koltunov, History of World War Two Magazine; The Battle of Kursk, David M. Glantz & Jonathan M. House, University Press of Kansas, 1999

Author: Jack Kruse writes military historical fiction set in World War II. He is currently completing a novel, tentatively titled Cauldron, about the aerial battle of the Kursk Salient, a key confrontation on the Russian front in which German and Soviet fighters and bombers engaged in an intensive series of engagements over the steppes of the Ukraine.

Kursk: The Battle Begins

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German forces on the southern edge of the Kursk bulge began reconnaissance in force in the late afternoon of 4 July, feeling out the Soviet defenses. To the east Grossdeutschland Grenadiers and the 11th Panzer Division also tested the Russians.

After midnight, in the midst of a thunderstorm, the Soviets began an artillery bombardment all along the front. Early on the morning of 5 July the Soviet Air Force launched its assaults on German air fields. German interceptors and anti-aircraft artillery claimed large numbers of Soviet aircraft. In spite of the exaggerated German claims, the Soviet air offensive had limited results.

In the north Model’s IXth Army began its artillery bombardment at 0430. The air attack began at 0510. The tank and infantry attack struck the Soviet 13th Army on a 40 kilometer front. Soviet resistance was assisted by the 16th Air Army. The northern forces were limited to an eight kilometers advance, breaking through the first Soviet defensive belt west of Ponyri.

In the south von Manstein’s forces, including Hoth’s IV Panzer Army and Operational Group Kempff’s III Panzer Corps, attacked the 6th Guard’s Army and the 7th Guards Army. The German attack included 700 tanks and was supported by 2,000 sorties by the Luftwaffe. By the end of the day Hausser’s SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and SS Totenkopf penetrated twenty kilometers creating a gap in the second defensive belt.

Sources: The Battle of Kursk, David M. Glantz & Jonathan M House, University of Kansas, 1999
‘Kursk: The Clash of Armour’, Colonel G. A. Koltunov, History of the Second World War Magazine

Author: Jack Kruse writes military historical fiction set in World War II. He is currently completing a novel, tentatively titled Cauldron, about the aerial battle of the Kursk Salient, a key confrontation on the Russian front in which German and Soviet fighters and bombers engaged in an intensive series of engagements over the steppes of the Ukraine.

Kursk: The Russian Preparations

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The Russians knew the German intentions for the Kursk salient. A Russian spy ring, ‘Lucy’, revealed the plan to Stalin as early as 8 April, 1943. General Rokossovsky commanding Central Front issued orders for preparation of defenses south of Orel on 10 April. General Vatutin, commander of Voronezh Front, issued his orders on 12 April. The commanders expected the German assault in the second half of May, after the spring thaw. Marshal Zhukov presented the defensive plans to Stalin on the evening of 12 April, within 24 hours of arriving in Moscow.

Immediately civilians began preparations. Roads and railways in the expected combat area were built, or repaired. Anti-tank trenches eventually totaling 3,100 miles in length were dug. Three to six defensive belts, each with two to three layers were constructed in the areas most likely to be attacked. Defensive works included block houses and anti-tank strongpoints. Evacuated towns were incorporated into the defensive works which were intended to funnel and concentrate enemy armored vehicles into kill zones.

To the east of Kursk a solid line of defense was established to protect the rear areas in case of a German breakthrough. This Reserve Front, soon renamed Steppe Front was commanded by General Koniev. If the German attack was blunted, wearing itself out on the Russian defenses, the Reserve Front had orders for a counter offensive.

By June more than 300,000 civilians were employed to complete the defensive works. In the meantime, partisans and the air force conducted attacks all along the German supply lines. Eventually, these defensive works along the Central and Voronezh Fronts contained 1.3 million men, 19,794 artillery pieces and mortars, and 3,489 tanks and self-propelled guns. They were supported by 2,650 aircraft.

By early July the Russians awaited the German attack with anxious anticipation.

Kursk: The German Plan Delayed

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The Kursk Bulge thrust westward out from the front line nearly 150 kilometers. Centered on Kursk, the bulge extended 280 kilometers north to south. The most obvious operation to eliminate the bulge and straighten the front line was concentric attacks from the north and south to pinch off the bulge at the base. The Germans expected to slice through the Soviet defenses, meet at Kursk itself and cut off and surround all Soviet forces within the bulge. The Germans used this technique effectively at Minsk, Smolensk and Kiev in the 1941 attacks. Hitler’s operational order, issued 15 April, 1943, outlined the plan, but no effective date was given. Hitler advised his generals to expect the execute order anytime after 1 May.

Hitler wanted significant numbers of the new Panzerkampfwagen V Panther, and the VI Tiger tanks for the planned attack. The weapon for the Tiger tank was the legendary 88 millimeter anti-tank gun,  and Hitler wanted the Tiger fitted with a longer barreled variant of the gun, but problems fitting the modified gun into the turret of the Tiger proved to be impossible. The answer was to place the longer barreled gun on a Porsche chassis yielding the Elephant. Hitler insisted that this weapon be made available for the Kursk offensive.

The initial start date of 1 May became 12 June, and then 1 July, then 3 July and finally 5 July. Even with these delays only 347 of the Panthers, Tigers, and Elephants were available out of a total of 1,866 armored vehicles available for use in the battle. The majority of the German tanks turned out to be Panzerkampfwagen IIIs and IVs. Both of these armored vehicles had been updated with improved armor and guns. The Mark IV was equivalent to the primary Soviet medium tank, the T-34 model 1943.

Source: The Battle of Kursk, David M. Glantz and Johathan M. House, University Press of Kansas, 1999

Formation of the Kursk Salient

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The battle for Stalingrad is one of the most familiar actions on the Eastern Front for most Americans. At the height of the fighting for Stalingrad, the Germans occupied the majority of the city. On November 19, 1942, the Soviet South-West Front, the Don Front, and the Stalingrad Front launched attacks from the northwest, the north, and the southeast of Stalingrad wrapping around the city and surrounding the VI Army led by General von Paulus. By November 23 the encirclement of VI Army was complete, and the Soviet siege began.

General Hoth attempted to penetrate the Soviet encircling force to relieve the VI Army, striking north from Kotelnikovo beginning on December 12. The relief attempt was brought to a halt on the Myshkova River by December 18. Even while the relief effort was taking place. The Voronezh Front under General Golikov, with the assistance of Vatutin’s South-West Front, attacked the Italian VIII Army and the Rumanian III Army, northwest of the city, opened a gap in the German line causing von Manstein to plug the hole with the replacements Hoth needed to continue his relief attempt.

On December 24 the South-West Front, the Don Front, and the Stalingrad Front attacked the stalled relief force taking Kotelnikovo on December 29 and driving Hoth’s forces back to the Aksay River. The time now seemed right for a general offensive by the Soviet Army. On January 13, 1943, from Orel in the north to Rostov on the Sea of Azov, the Bryansk Front, the Voronezh Front, the South-West Front, and the South Front surged forward. The Voronezh Front under General Golikov crossed the upper Don River and defeated the II Hungarian and VIII Italian Armies. General Vatutin took Voronezh on January 26.

General von Paulus surrendered the VI Army in Stalingrad on February 2, 1943.

The Soviet Army took Kursk on February 8, Kharkov and Voroshilovgrad on February 16, and Pavlograd, near Dnepropetrovsk on February 17. With Golikov attacking toward Kharkov and Vatutin advancing southwest toward Dnepropetrovsk, a gap opened in the Russian line of which von Manstein, the German commander, took advantage. On February 20 German forces attacked north from Krasnoarmeyskoye, and south from Krasnograd to cut off South-West Front’s spearhead attacking Dnepropetrovsk, while another assault from Poltava was thrust into the gap between the two Soviet armies aiming for Belgorod and Kharkov. With Vatutin retreating from von Manstein’s forces, Golikov’s left flank was exposed. He was able to move units south to cover his flank, but, ultimately he was forced to yield Kharkov, which the Germans took, again, on March 15, and Belgorod on March 18.

Manstein’s next planned move was to strike north toward Kursk, however, the spring thaw prevent it. The front stabilized on March 26 leaving a bulge in the line stretching west more than 100 miles, and 100 miles from north to south with Kursk very nearly in its center.

Sources: “Stalingrad: The Relief”, Colonel Alexander M. Samsonov, World War II Magazine; Kursk: the Clash of Armour, Geoffrey Jukes, Ballentine Books, 1968